ICYMI: Twitter Threads

Decided to post links to some of my Twitter threads, because most of these threads could (and maybe should) have been blog posts.

[listed in reverse chronological order]

On the Gorsuch nomination & whether the Democrats should filibuster: 3/20/17

Explaining the legal/policy issue of selling insurance “across state lines”: 3/7/17

A primer on class actions and why we have them: 2/16/17

On the case challenging the scope of Obergefell at SCOTX: 2/13/17

On federalism: 1/30/17

On work-life “balance”: 1/11/17

On appeals, standards of review, and reversal rates: 12/20/16

Some post-election thoughts about the Electoral College: 11/21/16

On judicial vacancies left unfilled: 11/18/16

On court-packing, reverse-court-packing, and constitutional norms: 10/26/16

The thread that launched the #AppellateTwitter coffee mugs: 10/22/16

On Flannery O’Connor & wanting to be an appellate lawyer: 9/14/16

Remembering where I was on 9/11: 9/11/16

On alternative-fee arrangements for appellate work: 9/6/16

On doing pro bono to get appellate experience: 8/23/16

The now-(in)famous thread on the social function of humor: 8/9/16

On RBG expressing political opinions: 7/13/16

On whether current SCOTUS can be called a “liberal” court: 6/28/16

And last but not least, the Twitter version of my life story: 10/23/16

Proposed Changes to SCOTX Jurisdiction

A bill (HB 1761) has been proposed in the Texas Legislature to change the Texas Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Below is my explanation (and first impression) of what the bill would do.

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Sullivan v. Abraham

Opinion boxSteed, J., dissenting.

The text matters. Words matter. Punctuation matters. But we have to ask ourselves: At what point does a devotion to strict textualism become an elaborate game of pretend?

Here, the Texas Legislature clearly stated the meaning it meant to convey in this particular provision of the Texas Citizens Participation Act. But the majority has decided that the most reliable indicator of the Legislature’s intended meaning is not what the Legislature said about its intended meaning. Instead, under the guise of textualism, the majority has decided that the clearest indicator of the statute’s intended meaning is the Legislature’s comma usage.

I cannot bring myself to join the majority in pretending that the Texas Legislature was so purposed and precise in its punctuation that it meant to undo its stated intentions by omitting a comma. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.

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